Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2017

Kathy Engle, Appellant, v. Wende Throne, Special Administrator
and Trustee, Judy Engle, Eldean Roy Engle, Britta Lynn Wilcken,
Alexa Thayer, and Bullock Law Firm, Appellees : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; hosted by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Kathy Engle, Pro Se; counsel for appellant.
Deborah Bulkeley, Woodall Carr Law Firm; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Engle v. Throne, No. 20170382 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2017).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3834

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate of Homer
Engle, deceased.

Case No. 20170382-CA

KATHY ENGLE,
Appellant,
vs.
WENDE
THRONE,
Special
Administrator and Trustee, JUDY
ENGLE, ELDEAN ROY ENGLE,
BRITTA LYNN WILCKEN, ALEXA
THAYER, and BULLOCK LAW
FIRM,
*REDACTED PUBLIC RECORD*
Appellees.
Brief of Appellee Wende Throne
Appeal from April 12, 2017 Order Closing Probate Based on Court’s Findings,
Conclusions, and Order Filed on April 7, 2017, in the Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Keith Kelly presiding.
Deborah L. Bulkeley (13653)
CARR | WOODALL, PLLC
10808 S. River Front Pkwy., Ste. 175
South Jordan, UT 84095
Telephone: 801-254-9450
Email: deborah@carrwoodall.com

Kathy Engle
P.O. Box 2225
Arvada, CO 80001
Appellant, pro se

Counsel for Appellee Wende Throne,
Special Administrator of the Estate of
Homer Engle and Trustee of the Homer
Engle 2010 Trust.

LIST OF INTERESTED NON-PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1)(B), the following parties to the trial court were
not designated as parties on appeal by the Appellant: The Estate of Homer
Engle*, The Homer Engle 2010 Trust*, York Howell & Guymon (former counsel
for Special Administrator); Fabian Van Cott (former counsel for Special
Administrator); Isaac Paxman Law, LC (former counsel for Judy Engle, Roy
Engle, and several business entities); Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association Phase II (judgment creditor).
*Although Appellant has not named the Estate or Trust as parties, they are
appropriate appellees and Wende Throne responds to Appellant’s brief in her role
as Special Administrator and Trustee.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................. 4
A. DISPOSITION. ....................................................................................................... 4
B. RELEVANT FACTS. .................................................................................................5
C. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY. ...................................................................... 6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................21
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................21
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER KATHY’S
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ARGUMENTS .........................................21
II. KATHY HAS SHOWN NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL
COURT’S RULING THAT HER OBJECTION TO ESTATE CLOSING WAS
UNTIMELY. ....................................................................................... 25
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER KATHY’S VARIOUS OTHER
ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE UNPRESERVED. ...................................... 28
IV. KATHY’S UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS AGAINST WENDE
ARE NOT CREDIBLE ......................................................................... 30
A. KATHY HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN RULING HER
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST WENDE LACK CREDIBILITY. ................................................... 32
1. Kathy’s accounting allegations lack credibility. ............................................... 33
2. Kathy’s property management allegations lack credibility. .............................35
B. THE SETTLEMENT RESOLVED ALL CLAIMS AMONG THE PARTIES THAT AROSE
BEFORE SEPTEMBER 3, 2013. .................................................................................... 36
C. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER KATHY’S ASSERTION THAT WENDE
HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE ESTATE CLOSING ORDER. ............................................. 37
V.

KATHY’S VARIOUS OTHER CLAIMS LACK MERIT. .................. 38
-ii-

A. YHG WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT; WENDE WAS STATUTORILY ENTITLE
TO HER ATTORNEY FEES. ........................................................................................... 39
B. KATHY’S ARGUMENTS RELATED TO VAN COTT, PAXMAN, AND HI-COUNTRY......... 41
VI. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD WENDE HER ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
ON APPEAL. .......................................................................................... 44
A. WENDE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE KATHY’S BRIEF IS FRIVOLOUS
AND FOR DELAY. ........................................................................................................ 44
B. WENDE IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE PROBATE CODE............47

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
Addendum B: *PRIVATE RECORD REDACTED*
Addendum C: October 3, 2016 Minute Entry and Order Denying Judy
Engle’s Motion to Remove Special Administrator Wende
Throne
Addendum D: April 12, 2017 Order Closing Probate; April 7, 2017 Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Addendum E: Transcript of trial court’s November 9, 2017 ruling that it
would not revisit its finding that allegations against Wende
lack credibility

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801 .......................... 29, 30
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991) ..................... 43
A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, 416 P.3d 465 ............................................................ 21, 44
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903 ............................................................. 23
Andersen v. Andersen, 2015 UT App 260, 361 P.3d 698 .................................... 28
Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411 (Utah 1998) ........................... 41
Bowen v. Hart, 2012 UT App 351, 294 P.3d 573 ............................................ 37-38
Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, 189 P.3d 40 ....................................................... 40
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995) ........ 41
Cattani v. Drake, 2018 UT App 77, 424 P.3d 1131 ............................................... 31
Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599 ................. 6
Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 123 P.3d 416.......................................................... 43
Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 345 P.3d 566 ...................................................... passim
Davis v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 152 U.S. 590 (1894) ............................................... 38
In re Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991) .......................................... 39
First Nat'l Bank of Layton v. Palmer, 2018 UT 43, 427 P.3d 1169 ..................... 43
Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57 ................................................ 36
Gines v. Edwards, 2017 UT App 47, 397 P.3d 612 ......................................... 24, 33
Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, 241 P.3d 375 ........... 31
Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, 345 P.3d 1168 .................................................. 3, 26
Hampton v. Prof’l Title Servs., 2010 UT App 294, 242 P.3d 796 .................. 21, 23
Harris v. Harris, 2002 UT App 401U .................................................................. 45
Hart v. Salt Lake Cty. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ............. 29-30
Hatch v. Kuhn (In re Estate of Kuhn), 2008 UT App 400U ................................. 27
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987) ...................................................... 39
Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, 285 P.3d 766 ................................... 40
iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC, 2018 UT App 40, 424 P.3d 970 passim
Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, 212 P.3d 535 ...................................................... 3, 4
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) ................................. 39
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) .................................................. 23
Packer v. National Service Indus., Inc., 909 P.2d 1277 (Utah App. 1996) ......... 43
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) ................................................... 45
Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, 416 P.3d 487 .............................................. 45, 56
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366 .......................................................... 29
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 86 P.3d 735 ................................... 43
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989) ..................... 28-29
Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, 406 P.3d 258 ..................................... 3, 33
Sivulich v. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 101, 348 P.3d 748 ....... 22, 26
State v. Bergeson, 2010 UT App 281, 241 P.3d 777 ............................................. 26
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993) .................................................. 29
-iv-

State v. Coco, 2008 UT App 128U ....................................................................... 28
State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, 52 P.3d 467 ............................................ 21-22
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, 366 P.3d 884 ......................................... passim
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 ................................................... 28, 30
State v. Johnson, 2013 UT App 276, 316 P.3d 994 .............................................. 29
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) ........................................................ 30
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988) ......................................................... 24
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 ....................................................... 28
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645 .......................................................... 33
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 114 P.3d 551 ........................................................... 30
State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 69 P.3d 1278 ................................................. 24, 33
State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, 86 P.3d 759 ................................................... 29
State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, 345 P.3d 1226 ............................................... passim
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 147 P.3d 448 .................................................. 22, 24
Stoddard v. Smith, 2001 UT 47, 27 P.3d 546 ....................................................... 27
Tulsa Professional Collection Services Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) .......... 39
Utah Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991) ............. 47
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) ............................................... 47
Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 2016 UT App 156, 380 P.3d 340 ............................... 27
Wing v. Still Standing Stable, LLC, 2016 UT App 229, 387 P.3d 605 ................ 22
Wolferts v. Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, 315 P.3d 448 ........................................ 29
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-403 ................................................................................... 39
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718 ................................................................................ 4, 41
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 .......................................................................... 4, 41, 47
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805 ............................................................................. 40, 41
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 ................................................................................... 1
Rules
Utah R. App. P. 4 ............................................................................................. 37, 38
Utah R. App. P. 11 .................................................................................................. 24
Utah R. App. P. 24 ......................................................................................... passim
Utah R. App. P. 33 ......................................................................................... passim
Utah R. Civ. P. 6 ............................................................................................... 26, 27
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 ................................................................................................... 33

-v-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate of Homer
Engle, deceased.

Case No. 20170382-CA

KATHY ENGLE,
Appellant,
vs.
WENDE
THRONE,
Special
Administrator and Trustee,
JUDY
ENGLE, ELDEAN ROY ENGLE,
BRITTA LYNN WILCKEN, ALEXA
THAYER, and BULLOCK LAW FIRM,
Appellees.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
INTRODUCTION
The probate of Homer Engle’s will on November 23, 2010 resulted in
immediate and rampant litigation. The litigation has largely been driven by
Kathy Engle and Judy Engle—Homer Engle’s two disinherited daughters—and
their relentless meritless attacks on Wende Throne that the trial court has
consistently found to lack credibility. In 2013, the parties entered into a global
settlement agreement to resolve issues and release all claims against each other.
Despite that agreement, the litigation and the meritless allegations against

Wende Throne continued. The trial court finally closed the estate in April 2018,
and in doing so found Kathy’s objection to the petition to close the estate was
untimely. It also once again found that allegations raised by Kathy, Judy and Roy
Engle against Wende Throne lacked credibility, and some of those allegations
were barred by the settlement agreement.
Kathy Engle’s brief does not acknowledge that the trial court has
consistently found the allegations against Wende Throne lacked credibility. She
also ignores that in signing the settlement agreement she agreed to waive all
claims against Wende Throne. Instead, it is a thinly-veiled continuation of more
than eight years of litigation in which the parties have persistently and viciously
attacked Wende in her attempts to administer the estate, which has resulted in
hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fees. For that reason, Appellant’s
brief should be stricken and her appeal dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should this Court entertain Kathy Engle’s various inadequately

briefed arguments, particularly where her brief misrepresents key facts, ignores
the trial court’s rulings that the claims raised lack credibility or are barred by the
settlement agreement?
Standard of Review. This Court may strike or disregard briefs that contain
“burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters” and may assess
appropriate sanctions, including attorney fees. Utah R. App. P. 24(i).
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2.

Should this Court reverse the trial court’s finding that Kathy Engle’s

late-filed objection to the estate closing was untimely where Kathy makes no
argument that the trial court exceeded its broad discretion, let along plainly
erred?
Standard of Review. A trial court’s determination that a filing is untimely
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 21, 345
P.3d 1168. This Court will not review an unpreserved claim absent a showing of
plain error or extraordinary circumstances. See Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶
34, 212 P.3d 535.
3. Should this Court reverse the trial court’s finding that the various
allegations against Wende raised over the years of litigation all lack credibility or
are barred by the settlement where Kathy’s unpreserved argument claim fails to
acknowledge the trial court’s rulings, let alone marshal the ample evidence that
supports them?
Standard of Review. This court will not set aside a trial court’s factual
findings “unless clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017
UT App 192, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d 258 (citation omitted). This Court will not review an
unpreserved claim absent a showing of plain error or extraordinary
circumstances. See Jacob, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 34.
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3.

Should this Court review Kathy’s other various unpreserved claims

related to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and its lack of jurisdiction to
order the release of certain liens?
Standard of Review. This Court will not review an unpreserved claim
absent a showing of plain error or extraordinary circumstances. See Jacob, 2009
UT 37, ¶ 34.
4.

Should this Court awarded Wende her attorney fees and costs on

appeal where Kathy Engle’s brief is frivolous or for delay, and where the trial
court awarded fees to be paid from the estate pursuant to statute?
Standard of Review.

This Court “shall award just damages” if it

determines an appeal is either frivolous or for delay.” Utah R. App. P. 33(a);
accord Id. R. 24(i). In addition, a statutory award of fees is appropriate pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718;
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719;
Utah R. App. P. 24;
Utah R. App. P. 33.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Disposition.
Kathy appeals from the trial court’s April 12, 2107 Order Closing Probate
Based on Court’s Findings, Conclusions, and Order Filed on April 7, 2017.
R8420-8423. On May 8, 2017, Kathy filed a notice of appeal. R8429-8431. No
-4-

other party appealed. See generally Record Index. The trial court thereafter on
October 3, 2017, entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
response to a Rule 60(b) motion by former counsel, R10697-713. On November
2, 2017, the trial court entered an Amended Order Closing Probate Dated as of
April 12, 2017 nunc pro tunc, R15443-460. Kathy did not file an amended or new
notice of appeal.1 See Record Index. As a result, this Court ruled on February 12,
2018 that this “appeal is limited solely to the issues and record existing at the
time the April 12, 2017 order was entered.”
B. Relevant Facts.
Homer Engle died on November 21, 2010. R11442. Homer Engle’s Last
Will and Testament (the “Will”) specifically disinherited his two daughters, Kathy
Engle and Judy Engle. R11448, 11453. It also specifically disinherited Roy Engle
and disavowed any blood relationship to him. R11448. The Will directed that all
of Homer Engle’s estate be distributed to the Homer Engle 2010 Trust (the
“Trust”), which Homer Engle amended and restated concurrently with the
signing of his Will. R11449, 11452, 11812. The Trust named Homer Engle’s
granddaughter Wende Throne as the successor trustee, and as with the Will, the
Trust specifically disinherited Judy Engle, Kathy Engle, and Roy Engle. R11813.
Homer Engle named Wende as the beneficiary of 50 percent of the residue of his

On October 31, 2018, this Court summarily dismissed a separate appeal by
Kathy of the trial court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion she filed April 16 2018 to
set aside the final order closing probate. See docket; Case No. 20180647.
1
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Trust estate, with the other 50 percent to be divided by Wende’s two daughters,
Alexa McCail Thayer and Britta Lynn Wilcken. R11828.
C. Relevant Procedural History.
When he died, Homer Engle claimed ownership, individually or via the
Trust, of the following properties listed in his Will: the State Street property, the
Woods Cross property, the Chesterfield property (referred to by the parties as
the Crystal Avenue property), the Spring Lake property (referred to by the
parties as the Payson property), the Price property, the listed the following
properties in his Will: Estate and/or Trust are referred to by the parties as the
Cherokee Lane property, the Payson property, the Price property, the Provo
Property (referred to by the parties as the Cherokee Lane property), and HiCountry Estates Lots 123, 124, and 130.2 R11449.
On November 23, 2010, shortly after Homer Engle died, Wende filed a
petition for formal probate of his Will in the Third District Court for Salt Lake
County. R11442-89. Concurrently therewith, Wende filed an application for
emergency appointment of special administrator and for temporary restraining
orders to prevent Kathy, Judy, and Roy from entering or otherwise interfering
with the Estate and Trust properties, and to keep them away from herself, her
family, and her own property. R11490-97. The application asserted that the

The legal descriptions for these properties are included as attachments to the
settlement agreement (Addendum B) and the April 6, 2017 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order (Addendum D).
2
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restraining orders were necessary due to “ongoing hostilities” among the
decedent and Judy, Roy, and Kathy, to protect the Estate/Trust assets as well as
Wende’s own person, family, and property. R11493-497. The trial court
appointed Wende as special administrator and entered the temporary
restraining orders, and later granted a preliminary injunction. R2-4; R115091526; R11704-711.
Kathy’s, Judy’s, and Roy’s challenges. Kathy, Judy and Roy each
initiated challenges to Homer Engle’s disinheritance of them and to Wende’s
appointment. The each also and filed multiple creditor’s claims on their own
behalf and on behalf of multiple business entities, claiming actual or equitable
interests in the Trust/Estate real and personal property. R1156-57, R11565,
R11719-11797, R11906-11909. Roy, apparently seeking to prove that he was in
fact Homer Engle’s son, also sought a court order allowing him to obtain a DNA
sample from the Decedent. R11527-34. Judy and Kathy also asserted equitable
interests in one or more estate properties based primarily on purported business
interests. See, e.g., R1156-57; R11565. For example, Kathy Engle claimed an
actual ownership interest in Hi-Country Lots 123, 124, 130. R11752. Although
their purported interests in the properties are primarily through entities, Kathy
has been pro se throughout the course of the proceedings, see, e.g., R11752
(Kathy Engle’s pro se creditor claim on behalf of various entities); R13509-13066
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(motion to strike Kathy Engle’s pro se filing).3 Judy and Roy have been pro se
since May 24, 2014, when their attorney, Isaac Paxman, at least in part because
they had already been filing pro se. R484-486. Isaac Paxman continued to
represent Judy’s and/or Roy’s entities until June 29, 2017. R9105-108.
Other Estate Creditors. The estate had several creditors with liens or
mortgages recorded against the various real properties. See, e.g., R11719-720;
14420421.

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase II (“Hi-

Country”) was a judgment creditor of the Estate as a result of summary
judgment it obtained for unpaid assessment on Hi-Country Lots 123, 124, and
130. R8387-8388; see Third District Court; Case No. 070918272. Hi-Country
also had liens against Lots 123, 124, and 130, which the parties agreed would
follow those properties. R14222.
Pre-settlement administration. Because the Estate/Trust assets
consisted almost entirely of real and personal property and because the highly
contentious litigation made it difficult to create liquid funds, there were not
sufficient funds to pay all the Estate’s bills, resulting in delinquent tax payments
and/or mortgage payments. See, e.g., R8-9, R14-15, R18-19, R21-23, Matters
were further complicated by the fact that Judy and Kathy controlled some of the

On information and belief, Isaac Paxman also briefly represented Kathy Engle,
but that representation is not immediately clear from the record.
3

-8-

assets.4 R3-4; R18-19; R14223-224. For example, the State Street property
remained under Judy’s control. R3-4. Homer Engle was in the process of
evicting Judy from the State Street property when he died. See docket; Third
District Court Case No. 090921857. On October 14, 2011, the trial court in the
wrongful detainer case declined to issue a restitution order because ownership
was being decided in the probate case, an instead ordered Judy to pay $800.00
per month into the court’s trust. R6141-43. The court’s order noted that Wende
“would like to lease the subject property and thus bring additional cash into the
estate,” and that Judy, “despite her claimed right of possession, is not currently
using the property in any way.” Id.
Because there were no liquid funds available, on April 26, 2013, Wende
moved for an order to sell the Cherokee Lane property to create funds to pay
property taxes for the Payson and State Street properties, and possibly a
mortgage on the Crystal Avenue property. R13368. Wende had negotiated to
postpone a tax sale of the State Street property, which was conditioned on being
able to pay the tax debt using proceeds from the sale of the Cherokee Lane
property. R13429.
On May 17, 2013 the trial court entered an order approving the sale of the
Cherokee Lane property and to use the proceeds to pay property taxes and other

The other parties sought to restrain Estate from liquidating or otherwise using
the various properties, see, e.g., R11919-924 (stipulated temporary restraining
order).
4
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estate debts. R13508-509; R30-31. The trial court also ordered that a loan could
be taken out to provide cash to save the properties, and that the parties were not
to interfere with selling the property or taking out a loan. Id. However, the
Cherokee Lane property was not sold because the parties soon thereafter reached
a global settlement agreement, in which they agreed to sell the Payson and Price
properties instead.
The Settlement. Kathy, Judy, Roy (as individuals and members of their
respective entities), and Wende (as an individual, special administrator of the
Estate and trustee of the Trust) eventually reached a settlement agreement,
which the trial court provisionally approved on September 13, 2013. R13836;
14216; 15405-06; 15409. Kathy agreed the settlement was binding as of that
date, as did Richard Gardner, then-counsel for Wende, an Isaac Paxman, thencounsel for Roy and Judy. R13836; R14216; R15405-06; R15409. On November
14, 2013, the trial court entered an order approving the form of the Settlement,
which was attached as Exhibit A to the order.5 R14181-183; R14211-228. The
Court set a hearing for final approval of the settlement agreement, and sent
notice to the Estate’s creditors, including Hi-Country. R766-799 (Notice of
Hearing, filed August 4, 2014). Hi-Country did not file an objection or appear at
either the first or second hearing to approve the settlement agreement. R956-

5

A copy of the settlement agreement is reproduced in Addendum B.
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961; R1116-1118. The trial court finally approved the settlement agreement on
December 2, 2014. R1153-173. The agreement’s terms included:

Acknowledgment that individuals and entities who were not parties
thereto, including Hi-Country and multiple lien/mortgage holders, had potential
interests in the real properties that were the subject of the agreement. R1421714218.

Distributing the real property as follows: Kathy was to receive a 5/6
ownership interest in each of the three Hi-Country lots (Lot 123, Lot 124, and Lot
130) and full ownership of the Crystal Avenue property. R14219. Judy was to
receive the Cherokee Lane property, the Woods Cross property, and a 1/6
ownership interest in each of the three Hi-Country Lots (Lot 123, Lot 124, and
Lot 130). R14219. The Trust was awarded the State Street Property. R14219.

Kathy was authorized by the settlement agreement to negotiate with
Hi-Country for the release of “only those assessments for which the Estate itself is
liable by virtue of the Hi-Country HOA Judgment. All other claims or
encumbrances relating to Hi-Country follow the property.” R14222. It further
stated: “There is no warranty or obligation to deliver Hi-Country to Kathy free
and clear of all claims whatsoever.” R14222.

Acknowledgment that significant legal fees had been incurred by
Homer Engle before he died, and by the Estate and the parties thereafter.
R14218-219. This included $141,000 in attorney fees claimed by Karen Kreeck,
and $135,000 in attorney fees as of the date of settlement claimed by Stephen
Sloan and Richard K. Gardner of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy (now
Fabian Van Cott).6 R14218-219. Although Isaac Paxman did not represent the
Estate, the parties agreed to classify his fees, which were $135,000 as of
settlement, as Estate fees. R14218-219. Each attorney was to receive at least
$100,000. R14220-221.

Prioritization of claims as follows: Priority I, certain enumerated
secured creditors, taxes on the State Street and Payson properties, and “$15,000
to each of Roy, Kathy, Wende” with Kathy’s claim being increased to $20,000;
Priority II, attorney fees owed to “Kreeck 141K, Van Cott 135K to date, Paxman,

Karen Kreeck withdrew on October 16, 2012. R12784-12789. Van Cott
represented Wende as special administrator from January 4, 2013 to February 6,
2014. R12823; R302-306.
6
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135K to date” with each attorney to receive at least $100,000; and 3) various
unsecured creditors. R14220-221.

The Payson and Price properties would be sold to pay costs of
administration and certain estate creditors. R14219. This was a modification of
the court’s prior order to sell the Cherokee Lane property. If neither property sold
in time to pay “McKinley” (a secured estate creditor) by a November 30 deadline,
then “the parties agree to take out a loan against Payson or Price.” R14223.

The parties to the settlement agreed to accept all property “as is.”
R14226-227.

The parties to the settlement released all claims against each other,
and agreed to “[n]o further legal proceedings except as necessary to carry out this
agreement.” R14226-27.
Post-settlement administration. Despite the settlement, Kathy and
Judy continued to interfere with Wende’s estate administration. Judy remained
in control of part of the State Street property and Judy was assigned to sell the
Price property. R14223-224. On November 26, 2013, the Court approved a plan
agreed to by Kathy, Judy, and Roy, for implementing the settlement agreement.
R14283-292.

In part, the agreement was for Wende to market and sell the

Payson property while also securing a loan on that property to pay expenses
including the taxes due on the State Street property; Judy was to handle selling
the Price property, and was also directed to take out a loan on it. R14284-285.
The properties did not sell quickly. As a result, on March 20, 2014, the
trial court ordered Wende to take out a loan secured by a deed of trust on the
State Street property for a least the amount owing in taxes, and in doing so found
that “this loan is consistent with the provisions governing loans on page 8 of the
September 3, 2013 settlement agreement (as reflected in the order dated
-12-

November 14, 2013) and is necessary and appropriate because the Payson and
Price properties may not sell soon enough to prevent a tax sale on the State Street
property.” R366; R 345 (minute entry).7 Despite this order, Wende was unable
to obtain the court-ordered loan due to interference by Kathy, Judy and Roy.
R445-446. As a result, on May 19, 2014, the trial court granted a temporary
restraining order to prevent interference by Kathy, Judy, and Roy. R445-446.
The trial court also entered a civility order that directed:
The parties are to cooperate and not interfere with the duties and
responsibilities of the Special Administrator to carry out court orders
and matters of the Estate. The parties will not make efforts to
prevent the Special Administrator from following through with Court
orders.” R731-733.
At a May 21, 2015, hearing, it was proffered that the parties were now
interfering in Wende’s effort to sell the Payson property. The trial court ordered
the parties to “not to interfere with the deal or communicate with the people who
are negotiating with the broker” regarding the sale of the Payson property.
R10810-811. Based on the concern that the parties may be attempting to “find
out who is making an offer” so that they could contact that party, the court
further ordered all parties except Wende and her counsel not to contact the
potential buyer. R10810-811. The Payson and Price properties eventually sold for
$254,448.00 and $70,015.00 respectively, after the trial court approve the sale of
those properties. R5334; R6129.

Kathy did not include the transcript of the March 4, 2014 hearing in the record.
See Record Index.
7
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With regard to Payson, the trial court specifically authorized Wende to
accept an offer to sell the Payson property for $254,448.00. R5057, R5061,
R5336. The trial court ruled that the offer was the most reasonable one because
it was without conditions and was recommended by Wende’s counsel and real
estate agent, and that no party objected to the sale at that price. R5057, R5061,
R5334-338.
The Price property was sold to Kathy, Judy and Roy. Roy’s priority I claim
was satisfied through this purchase, and Kathy’s priority I claim was at least
partially satisfied. At the estate closing, Kathy was to provide evidence to support
her assertion that $11,759.36 was still owed to her, but it is not clear from the
record that she ever did. R6069 n.3; R6137; R10983-84 (Kathy stating that she
did not file a written claim for any outstanding amount on her priority one claim;
but was relying on the settlement agreement).
Allegations against Wende lack credibility. Throughout the years of
litigation, Kathy and Judy have asserted numerous allegations against Wende in
her role as special administrator and have unsuccessfully attempted to unseat her
as special administrator. See e.g. R11565 (Kathy alleging “Wende Throne’s
misleading activities as estate administrator”). The trial court has consistently
found these allegations to lack credibility.8

As stated, in the settlement agreement, Kathy, Judy and Roy agreed to waive all
claims against Wende as of the date of settlement, September 13, 2013, therefore
8
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For example, at the May 21, 2015 hearing on the sale of the Payson
property, Judy accused Wende of breaching her duties by defaulting on a loan,
asserting that Wende had $10,600.00 or $15,000.00 available for that to pay it.
R10818-23. However, as the trial court pointed out, the money Judy was
referring to was being held in trust by the court in the wrongful detainer case,
which meant that Wende did not have ready access to it. R10824-25. The trial
court reasoned that “breach” was not accurate because Wende had been
negotiating with the original lender for an extended period of time, and because
she did not have the funds available “to just write a check to pay off” that lender.
R10825-826. It would take a court order from the wrongful detainer court (Case
No. 090921857) to free up the funds that Judy was referring to. R10826. The
trial court ruled, “I do not see the special administrator as having violated her
duty by negotiating with Capital Assets and getting a take-out loan.” R10828. At
a later hearing, counsel for Wende expressed concern that a report related to the
“strategic, systematic reduction of price to try and get a sale in place” for the
Payson property not be distributed to Kathy, Judy and Roy because of the risk
they would disseminate it to third parties “to the disadvantage of the estate.”
R11250.9

the Special Administrator only addresses the trial court’s findings from after that
date. R14226-227.
Kathy only included a partial transcript of the February 24, 2016 hearing, and
much of the discussion of the Payson property was omitted. R11249.
9

-15-

In August 2016, Judy Engle moved to have Wende removed as special
administrator, alleging among other things that Wende had mismanaged and or
stolen certain properties. R4960. Wende responded that the allegations against
her lacked merit. R5185-90. In another round of similar filings at the same time,
Kathy accused Wende of a conflict of interest, alleging among other things, that
she had breached her duties by not making timely loan payments, and allegedly
collecting $90,000 from rental properties but refusing to “pay any properties.”
R5247.
At an August 31, 2016 hearing, the trial court turned over management for
the State Street property from Judy to Wende. R5258. After an October 3, 2016
evidentiary hearing, the denied the motion to remove Wende as special
administrator because Judy “failed to meet the statutory burden necessary to
show cause for removal of Wende Throne as the Special Administrator.” R5494503; R5613-15.10
Finally, Kathy Engle’s untimely objection to Wende’s petition to close the
estate alleged that Wende had not conducted an appropriate accounting, had
failed to properly account for the estate personal property, and had misused or
mismanaged estate assets. R7393-417.
The trial court’s April 7, 2017 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
ruled that the prior and new allegations against Wende “lack credibility,” and

Kathy did not include the transcript of the October 3, 2016 hearing in the
record. The minute entry and resulting order are attached in Addendum C.
10
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were “not well taken, and (as noted above) untimely.” R8385. It further ruled
that as a party to the settlement agreement, Kathy had “waived all claims …
arising prior to September 3, 2013.” Id. The Court made a similar ruling with
regard to the similar allegations against Wende raised by Judy and Roy Engle.
R8384-8385.
On November 3, 2017, the trial court declined Kathy’s invitation to revisit
its ruling on the matter.11 R15461-462; R17518-528. The court explained that it
had “very carefully considered” the allegations and that is ruling was based on
dozens of hearings, including evidentiary hearings, legal arguments, affidavits,
and testimony. R17520-521. “And, unfortunately, this estate has had, has just
been full of venom and attacks on the special administrator that have just lacked
credibility.” R17522. The trial court noted these attacks had been “relentless …
claiming that she's committed all kinds of wrongdoing over the years.” R17521.
The trial court found these “long, repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated attacks,
repeated attacks on the special administrator.... I have found those to lack
credibility. They just haven't stood up to the analysis of the facts.” R17525. The
trial court noted that in addition to lacking credibility, the litigation “has been
dragged out for a period of time due to animosity against the special
administrator and attacks against the special administrator. So that's my
finding.” R17525-526.

A transcript of the entire ruling is reproduced in Addendum E. Kathy did not
appeal from this ruling. See Record Index.
11
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Accountings and Estate Closing. In April 2016, the parties filed
various accountings with the trial court for the accounting period from January 1,
2013 to January 31, 2016. Wende filed a balance sheet, ledger, profit and loss
statement, and transaction details for the Estate January 1, 2013 through January
31, 2016. R2967-2971; R3347-350, R3749. Kathy and Judy were able to submit
questions about Wende’s accounting, which she answered in detail and provided
additional documentation. R4162-287.
On December 15, 2016, Wende filed a petition to close the estate, and she
filed an amended petition on December 29, 2016. R5948-6057; R6066-6173.
The amended petition outlined that Wende had fulfilled her duties by selling the
Payson and Price properties, satisfying the Payson and State Street property tax
claims, and satisfying various priority I claims. R6068-069. The petition asserted
that Kathy’s priority I claim had been partially satisfied and Kathy was to provide
proof of any outstanding amount. As of the estate closing, Wende was the only
Priority I claimant who had none of her claim satisfied, she also did not charge an
hourly rate for her services despite her authority to do so. The amended petition
also sought to join the wrongful detainer action to the probate so that the funds
held in trust could be released. The petition sought to have those funds
distributed to State Street.
The remaining distributions were to be as follows: 5/6 of the Hi-Country
properties and the Crystal Avenue property to Kathy; the Cherokee property, the
Woods Cross property, and one-sixth of the Hi-Country properties to Judy; and
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the State Street property, including rents held in escrow by the court in case no.
090921857 to Wende as trustee of the Trust. R6070. The petition also included
a request for fees performed by YHG for Wende in her capacity as special
administrator.12 R6072-073. The final accounting included a balance sheet,
profit and loss statement, and general ledger from January 31, 2013 to December
15, 2016. R6166-173.
The trial court set a January 18, 2018 deadline for objections, which was
extended by the parties’ stipulation to January 30, 2017. R5873, R6365. On
February 1, 2017, Kathy filed an untimely objection to the petition. R7393;
R8384.
The Court heard the petition on February 21, 2017.13 R8107-111. At the
hearing, the trial court heard arguments related to the outstanding issues,
including the Hi-Country judgment and liens, attorney fees14 and Judy’s fraud
claim. It specifically ruled as to claims of misconduct by Wende, “as of the time
The request for fees only requested fees for YHG’s representation of Wende as
special administrator. The trial court had previously found YHG’s legal fees from
before June 1, 2016 to be “reasonable and payable.” R5259, R6046, R8385-386.
12

Kathy included only a partial transcript of this hearing in the record. The
transcript includes discussion of the Hi-Country claims, a partial discussion of
the attorney fees (Roy Engle’s argument is omitted). R11021. It does not include
the first part of the hearing, or a record of a discussion of Judy’s renewed claims
of “fraud” or the first part of the trial court’s ruling, which concluded with the
court’s statement that “it’s just been dealt with.” R11077, R11035-036.
13

Karen Kreeck claimed $141,000.00, R10988, Van Cott claimed $224,288.83 in
attorney fees, R418, Isaac Paxman claimed at least $273,687.65. R5464. YHG’s
claim was supplemented and increased to $60,315.25. R8140-8142. YHG had
previously been awarded $21,139.00 from the Estate. R5258.
14
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of settlement, those issues were resolved and those claims were waived.”
R10980. During discussion of the attorney fees, Kathy affirmed that her
“expenses as to taking care of McKinley were taken care of in the settlement of
Price.” R11013-014.
On April 6, 2017, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order which found and concluded that:

Wende provided a complete accounting. Kathy and Judy had
previously submitted questions to Wende that Wende answered. R8384-8385.
The court approved Wende’s accounting as to form and content. R8391.

The allegations against Wende from before October 2016 had been
previously litigated and found to have been lacking in credibility. The allegations
from before September 2013 were waived by the settlement agreement. The
new allegations were untimely, not well taken and lacked credibility. R8384-385.

The trial court awarded York, Howell & Guymon (YHG) $60,315.25
in statutory attorney fees for its representation of Wende as special
administrator from May 8, 2014 to May 31, 2017. R845-846; R8684; R5954955; R6033-048. In awarding YHG attorney fees according to statute, the trial
court reasoned that YHG had not been a party to settlement agreement and that
the fees requested were reasonable. R8386, 8389-90, 8391-92.

The remaining $10,568.33 held by the estate was to be paid to Isaac
Paxman and Van Cott for their claims for fees. R8390. The trial court found
that both Paxman and Van Cott had done work necessary to prevent waste. Id. It
did not award any fees to Karen Kreeck because she did not respond to the
motion for summary judgment in the Hi-Country case. R8389, 8392.

There were not sufficient funds remaining to pay Wende her
$15,000 Priority I claim or Kathy any amount remaining of her partially satisfied
Priority I claim. R6069, R8382, 8390.

Hi-Country would not receive payment from the Estate because it
had not timely objected to the approval of the settlement agreement. R83908391, 8392. The Court also declined to order the release of the Hi-Country liens
from Lots 123, 124 and 130, which Kathy and Judy were to receive as tenants-incommon because the court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Kathy’s brief should be stricken in its entirety because it does not identify
where in the record the issues she raises were preserved, fails to support her
arguments with record evidence or analysis of pertinent case law, for the most
part entirely ignores the trial court’s rulings, and continues more than eight years
of persistent, meritless attack against Wende Throne in her capacity as special
administrator.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ARGUMENTS

KATHY’S

“[O]ur system is designed so that the ‘appellant must do the heavy lifting,’”
Hampton v. Prof’l Title Servs., 2010 UT App 294, ¶ 5, 242 P.3d 796 (quoting
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448). “Arguments, like gardens,
take work, and a party who hopes to prevail on appeal should be willing to dig in
the dirt and not expect that opposing counsel or the court will do that work for
them.” A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 465; accord State v. Roberts, 2015
UT 24, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 1226 (“appellants who fail to follow rule 24’s substantive
requirements will likely fail to persuade the court of the validity of their
position.”). Therefore, to “permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must
comply with the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable” the Court to
understand “what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record
those errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those errors are
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material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.” State v. Garner, 2002 UT
App 234, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 467 (quotation and citation omitted); accord Dahl v. Dahl,
2015 UT 23, ¶ 141, 345 P.3d 566 (appellant has “burden of directing [the Court’s]
attention to specific facts in the record to support her contention that the district
court abused its discretion”). As a result, this Court may “disregard or strike
briefs that do not comply with rule 24’s substantive requirements.” Roberts,
2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; see also State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47, 366 P.3d 884
(“Hawkins fails to support this argument with citations to any legal authority”
and therefore “failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal”); Sivulich v.
Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 101, ¶ 3, 348 P.3d 748 (declining to
address argument that simply “reargues his position that the Board’s findings
were wrong” without pointing to evidence); In addition, this Court rejects
challenges to arguments that do not address the actual basis for the trial court’s
ruling. See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC, 2018 UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424
P.3d 970 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of the district court’s
ruling, we reject the challenge.”); Wing v. Still Standing Stable, LLC, 2016 UT
App 229, ¶ 19, 387 P.3d 605 (same). And, the Court has discretion to strike briefs
that include “burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters, and the
court may assess an appropriate sanction including attorney fees for the
violation.” Utah R. App. P. 24(i).
Although the Court grants pro se parties “‘every consideration that may
reasonably be indulged,’” this does not relieve self-litigants of their burden on
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appeal. Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11, 194 P.3d 903 (quoting Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). A party who represents herself is
generally “‘held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified
member of the bar.’” Id. (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213). The Court should
therefore “decline to undertake the gargantuan task of sifting through the record
in this case to make [Kathy’s] argument for her.” See Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 345 P.3d
566; see also Hampton, 2010 UT App 294, ¶ 5 (quoting State v. Robison, 2006
UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448) (alteration in original) (“‘An appellate court that does
the lifting for an appellant distorts [the] fundamental allocation of benefits and
burdens.’”).
Kathy’s brief simply does not comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. While it raises several issues, it does not provide any record citations
to where in the record any of those issues were preserved, instead inviting the
Court to sort through voluminous record pages to find out what, if any, issues
Kathy raised in the trial court. Br.Aplt. 9. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) (requiring
“citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved”). Nor does Kathy
clearly state the standard of review for any individual issue. See Br.Aplt. 7-9;
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Additionally, Kathy fails to adequately support her
various arguments with record citations or relevant legal authority, instead
making largely bald allegations while misstating the law. Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(6) (“The statement of the case must include … citations to the record”); id.
R. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with reasoned analysis supported by
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citations to legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on
appeal.”).
The brief largely ignores the trial court’s rulings, instead appearing to seek
de novo review of Kathy’s various grievances against Wende, some of which arose
after Kathy filed her notice of appeal. It is peppered with “burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial, [and] scandalous matters.” See Utah R. App. P. 24(i)
(providing sanctions, including striking or disregarding a brief, and/or other
“appropriate sanction including attorney fees”). For example, pages 17-19 of
Kathy’s brief are riddled with of false and unsubstantiated claims against Wende
while also failing to mention that the trial court consistently ruled that the
allegations were not credible and that Wende had provided a complete
accounting. R8384-385.
Finally, because Kathy failed to include in the record full transcripts of all
the hearings, including those related to her various allegations against Wende,
she cannot now claim that the trial court’s “finding or conclusion is unsupported
by or is contrary to the evidence.” Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). If “an appellant fails
to provide an adequate record on appeal, we presume the regularity of the
proceedings below.” State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 1278. As a
result, “[w]hen crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing
portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.” Id. (citing State v.
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)); see also Gines v. Edwards, 2017 UT
App 47, ¶ 21, 397 P.3d 612 (“It is well established that in the absence of a
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transcript of a crucial proceeding, we will presume that a trial court's decision is
reasonable, supported by the evidence, and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.”). Specifically, Kathy did not include a transcript of the October 3,
2016 hearing at which the trial court heard evidence before denying a motion to
remove Wende as special administrator, or the portion of the February 21, 2017
transcript that dealt with allegations of “fraud.” See Record Index.
For all of the above reasons, Kathy’s brief is so devoid of analysis that she
leaves this Court to guess at what rulings she is even challenging. It also
mischaracterizes the record, entirely fails to adequately cite the record, and lacks
supporting relevant legal authority. Kathy therefore has not provided this Court
with “reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record.”
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(8). Kathy has therefore entirely failed to meet her burden
of persuasion, and this Court should exercise its discretion to “disregard or
strike” her brief and award Wende her reasonable attorney fees incurred in
defending against it. See Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; Utah R. App. P. 24(i).
II.

KATHY HAS SHOWN NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE
TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT HER OBJECTION TO
ESTATE CLOSING WAS UNTIMELY.
Kathy appears to argue that the trial court “erred” when it ruled her

objection to the estate closing was untimely.15 Br.Aplt. 6, 17, 43. However,
Kathy’s brief does not cite to any part of the record where Kathy preserved this
Although Kathy’s brief refers to an objection to settlement, from the context, it
appears she referring to the trial court’s ruling on her February 5, 2017 objection
to the amended petition to close the estate.
15
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argument, nor does it make even a cursory argument that the trial court exceeded
its discretion, let alone plainly erred, in its ruling that her objection was untimely.
See id. Instead, it simply states that this Court should “[d]irect[] the District
Court to rule Kath[y’s] Objection’s to the Closing out of the Estate was timely.”
Br.Aplt. at 43. This bald assertion without any citation to supporting authority is
not enough to meet Kathy’s burden on appeal. See, e.g., Hawkins, 2016 UT App
9, ¶ 47 (“Hawkins fails to support this argument with citations to any legal
authority” and therefore “failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal”);
Sivulich, 2015 UT App 101, ¶ 3 (declining to address argument that simply
“reargues his position that the Board’s findings were wrong” without pointing to
evidence).
In any event, Kathy has not shown an abuse of discretion, let alone
obvious, harmful error. Although trial courts may extend time “for good cause”
on motion made after time has expired “if the party failed to act because of
excusable neglect,” Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), they also “have broad discretion ‘to
manage [their] docket[s] and set firm deadlines for motion practice.’” Gonzalez,
2015 UT 10, ¶ 48 (quoting State v. Bergeson, 2010 UT App 281, ¶ 7, 241 P.3d 777)
(alterations in original). “Recognition of the trial court’s prerogative to manage
its docket serves a number of beneficial interests, including promoting judicial
efficiency and economy, creating a predictable system of advocacy, fostering
finality in convictions, and reducing litigation expenses.” Id.
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As stated, Kathy filed her objection to Wende’s petition to close the estate
on February 1, 2017—two days after the January 30, 2017 stipulated deadline.
R5873, R6365, R7393, R8384. The record does not reflect that Kathy requested
an extension before or after the filing deadline. See generally Record Index.
Kathy’s brief does not make even a cursory argument that the trial court abused
its discretion, let alone plainly erred, when it ruled, “Kathy’s Objection was filed
on February 1, 2017, two days after the deadline established by the Amended
Scheduling Order and, therefore, is untimely.” R8384. See, e.g., Stoddard v.
Smith, 2001 UT 47, ¶ 25, 27 P.3d 546 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiff’s motion to extend time to file a motion for substitution of
parties where plaintiff failed to show excusable neglect); Williams v. Dep’t of
Corr., 2016 UT App 156, ¶ 28, 380 P.3d 340 (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling inmate’s filing was untimely where trial court noted inmate
had “managed to timely file documents … over the course of this litigation”);
Hatch v. Kuhn (In re Estate of Kuhn), 2008 UT App 400U, *2 (trial court did not
exceed its discretion in striking untimely opposition to motion for summary
judgment where appellant “made no showing of excusable neglect”). Instead,
Kathy cites Rule 6(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the basis for her
argument. But that rule, which allows three extra days for parties to respond to
papers served on them by mail, is inapplicable where the deadline was set by a
stipulated court order, not the date of the service on Kathy (who was served by
email, not mail). See R6076; Utah R. Civ. P. 6(c).
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Thus, because Kathy’s brief has not made even a cursory argument as to
why the exceeded its broad discretion, let alone plainly erred, in ruling her
objection was untimely, Kathy has not met her burden of persuasion. See
Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶11; Utah R. App. P. 24(i).
III.

This Court should decline to consider Kathy’s various other
arguments because they are unpreserved.
Kathy does not cite any specific part of the record where she preserved any

argument, but throughout her brief states that she raised her arguments in the
untimely objection. See, e.g., Br.Aplt. 9, 39. Because Kathy’s objection was not
timely filed, it did not preserve any argument that Kathy now raises on appeal.
Because Kathy also does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances exist,
this Court should decline to consider any of her arguments.
“As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. “[T]he
preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions,
unless [an appellant] can demonstrate that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist or
‘plain error’ occurred.”16 Id. (citations omitted); accord Andersen v. Andersen,
2015 UT App 260, ¶ 4, 361 P.3d 698 (“An appellant is required to include a
citation to the record showing that each issue was preserved in the district
court.); State v. Coco, 2008 UT App 128U (quoting Salt Lake County v.
Plain error requires showing obvious, harmful error, i.e. that the trial court’s
ruling is contrary to well-settled case law and that absent the error there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See, e.g.,
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 31, 12 P.3d 92.
16
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Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989) (“‘It is axiomatic that, before a
party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it
was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
thereon.’”).
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must make
a timely objection that provides the trial court with an adequate opportunity to
correct any claimed errors. “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been
presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity
to rule on that issue." Wolferts v. Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶ 19, 315 P.3d 448;
accord 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (same).
“To provide the court with this opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised
[by the party asserting error], in a timely manner, and must be supported by
evidence and relevant legal authority.” Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶
19 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);accord
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366 (same); State v. Richins, 2004
UT App 36, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (same).
The timeliness requirement is “a pre-condition to appellate review because
entertaining belatedly raised issues sanction[s] the practice of
withholding positions that should properly be presented to the trial court but
which may be withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal.’” State v.
Johnson, 2013 UT App 276, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 994 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
358, 361-62 (Utah App. 1993)) (alteration in original); accord Hart v. Salt Lake
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Cty. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (explaining the timeliness
requirement affords the trial court “an opportunity to rule on the issue’s merits”).
In addition, preservation requires the appellant to “state clearly and
specifically all grounds for objection.” State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12
(Utah 1993). Thus, even timely objections will not preserve an issue for appeal if
they lack specificity and do not “introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority.” 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51. Merely presenting evidence at trial
that could potentially support a claim of error is not sufficient to preserve it for
appeal. Rather, an appellant must make a specific and timely objection to the
trial court. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45, 114 P.3d 551.
This Court should decline to address any of the issues raised in Kathy’s
brief because the objection that she cites to as preserving them was untimely, and
she does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule should apply. See
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11.
IV.
KATHY’S
UNSUBSTANTIATED
AGAINST WENDE ARE NOT CREDIBLE

ALLEGATIONS

Kathy appears to argue that Wende breached her duties as special
administrator by 1) not properly protecting estate property, primarily the State
Street property (Br. Aplt. at 7, 17-18, 41); 2) using “improper accounting
methods” (Br.Aplt. at 7, 42-43); and 3) not distributing the real properties
pursuant to the estate closing order (Br.Aplt. at 4, 18, 41-42).

-30-

These arguments ignore that the trial court has consistently found the
parties’ allegations against Wende to lack credibility. In its April 6, 2017 findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court specifically found and concluded
that:
 All parties to the settlement agreement “have released all claims
against each other arising on or before September 3, 2013.”
 All claims of wrongdoing against Wende arising on or before October
3, 2016 “have already been litigated, found to lack credibility, and
denied by the Court.”
 Wende “has a provided a complete accounting of the Estate financial
transactions that have occurred from January 2013 to the present.”
 Kathy, Judy and Roy, were allowed to submit questions to Wende
about the accounting, and Wende answered their questions.
 As with Judy’s and Roy’s allegations, “Kathy’s current allegations of
wrongdoing lack credibility” and “are untimely.”
R8384-8385. Kathy’s brief entirely fails to acknowledge those findings by the
trial court. As a result, this Court should decline to consider any of the
allegations against Wende. See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC, 2018
UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424 P.3d 970 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of
the district court’s ruling, we reject the challenge.”); accord Cattani v. Drake,
2018 UT App 77, ¶ 52, 424 P.3d 1131 (declining to consider appellants arguments
that were “silent as to the district court's conclusion”); Golden Meadows Props.,
LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, ¶ 17, 241 P.3d 375 (appellant who “fails to attack
the district court’s” ruling “cannot demonstrate that the district court erred”).
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As will be shown, Kathy’s failure to acknowledge the trial court’s findings
and the evidence supporting them is fatal to her attempt to show the trial court
exceeded its broad discretion, let alone plainly erred in its ruling that her old and
new allegations all lacked credibility or had been waived.
A. Kathy has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in ruling
her allegations against Wende lack credibility.
Kathy’s brief is peppered with various unsupported allegations of
wrongdoing against Wende related to her Estate accounting and managing of
Estate properties. See Br.Aplt. at 7, 17-18, 41-43. Specifically, Kathy alleges that
Wende did not provide a proper accounting of all estate assets “from the time of
death” and should be required to do so and that she mismanaged the State Street
property. Br.Aplt. 42-43.
As stated, this Court should “reject the challenge” because Kathy fails to
acknowledge that the trial court has found her allegations to lack credibility and
has also ruled that she waived all claims that arose before September 2013 by
entering into the settlement agreement. See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore
LLC, 2018 UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424 P.3d 970. Kathy has also failed to provide a
complete record of Kathy’s brief ignores the ample record evidence that supports
the trial court’s findings that the allegations against Wende lack credibility. She
did not include a transcript of the October 3, 2016 hearing at which parties
presented evidence related to those claims. She included only a partial transcript
of the February 24, 2016 hearing and of the February 21, 2017 hearing. This
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“absence of a transcript of a crucial proceeding,” means that the Court should
“presume that [the] trial court’s decision is reasonable, supported by the
evidence, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” See Gines v. Edwards,
2017 UT App 47, ¶ 21, 397 P.3d 612; accord State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13,
69 P.3d 1278 (same). Finally, Kathy failed to appeal from the trial court’s ruling
that it would not alter its finding that the allegations against Wende lack
credibility, in part because the “long, repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated
attacks, repeated attacks on the special administrator.... just haven't stood up to
the analysis of the facts.” R17525.
In any event, Kathy cannot show an abuse of discretion, let alone plain
error because she ignores the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that
the allegations lack credibility. “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, [the Court] will not set aside a trial court's factual findings ‘unless
clearly erroneous,’ giving ‘due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.’” Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶3 (quoting Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a)(4)). Kathy’s failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court’s findings “greatly undermine[s]” the persuasiveness of her argument on
appeal. Cf. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶44, 326 P.3d 645 (sufficiency of
evidence challenge).
1. Kathy’s accounting allegations lack credibility.
Kathy’s unpreserved arguments related to Wende’s accounting ignore the
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that her accounting was complete.
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For example, while Kathy cites to her own objection to the accounting, she
ignores that Wende has provided multiple accountings, that she was able to ask
questions about those accountings, and that Wende answered those questions.
R2967-971; R3347-50; R3749; R4162; R6066-173. It further ignores that the
trial court heard evidence on Judy’s motion to remove Wende, which included
allegations related to accounting, and rejected it. R5494-503; R5613-15. Finally,
Finally, ignoring the trial court’s ruling that Wende provided “Kathy vaguely
asserts that Wende did not comply with GAAP and therefore a special master
should be appointed, but she does not point to any specific part of the accounting
that is incomplete or inaccurate, or cite any authority to support her assertion.
Br.Aplt. 39-40, 42-43. Moreover, Kathy ignores that the Court specifically found
that Wende “provided a complete accounting” and approved it as to form and
content. R8385, 391.
She therefore cannot meet her burden of persuasion to show that the trial
court abused its discretion, let alone plainly erred, in approving Wende’s
accounting rather than sua sponte appointing a special master. See, e.g., Dahl,
2015 UT 23, ¶ 67 (appellant has “burden of directing [the Court’s] attention to
specific facts in the record to support her contention that the district court
abused its discretion”); Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47 (appellant who did not
support argument with analysis of legal authority “failed to carry his burden of
persuasion on appeal”).
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2. Kathy’s property management allegations lack credibility.
Kathy further asserts that Wende breached her duties by taking out a loan
rather than using rental proceeds to pay property taxes, primarily on the State
Street property. Br.Aplt. 18-19. Kathy’s argument ignores that the trial court on
more than one occasion ordered Kathy, Judy and Roy to not interfere with her
estate administration. See, e.g., R13508-509; R30-31; R10825-826. It also
ignores the trial court’s specific ruling that such a loan was needed because there
were no funds available to pay the taxes. R10825-826. It ignores that the parties’
settlement agreement contemplated loans, and that the court ordered that a loan
be taken out to save the State Street property. R14223, R10833. Kathy’s brief
further ignores that Wende was willing to use $10,000.00 of her own personal
funds to avoid foreclosure if needed. R10833. Finally, Kathy ignores that the
trial court specifically rejected an allegation that not paying a loan was a breach
of duty because Wende had been negotiating with the original lender for an
extended period of time, and because the Estate did not have the funds available
“to just write a check to pay off” that lender. R10825-826.
Thus, Kathy has not demonstrated that the trial court’s findings are against
the clear weight of the evidence, let alone that the trial court plainly erred in its
rulings. See, e.g., Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 67; Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47.
As a result of the foregoing, Kathy’s arguments do not comport with rule
24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and she cannot meet her burden of
persuasion on appeal to show that the trial court’s finding that her allegations
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against Wende lack credibility, let alone that the trial court’s finding was plain
error. See, e.g., Roberts 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18.
B. The settlement resolved all claims among the parties that arose
before September 3, 2013.
Kathy’s various purported grievances that arose before the settlement
agreement and argument that Wende should be required to provide an
accounting “from date of death” ignores the plain language of settlement
agreement. Br.Aplt. 20-21, 42. Her arguments also ignore that the trial court
ruled that the parties’ settlement “released all claims against each other arising
on or before September 3, 2013.” R8384.
When a contract’s language is unambiguous, “courts ‘first look to the four
corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties . . . from the
plain meaning of the contractual language.’” Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351,
¶ 34, 121 P.3d 57 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT
3, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599). Kathy concedes that the “plain terms of the Settlement
Agreement dictate the outcome of this appeal.” Br.Aplt. 26. The settlement
unambiguously provides: “All parties would release all claims against all parties.”
R14226.
Kathy does not acknowledge the trial court’s ruling or challenge it. Nor
does she argue any ambiguity or latent ambiguity in her release of claims. Thus,
Kathy has not shown the trial court abused its discretion, let alone plainly erred
in ruling that the settlement agreement “released all claims against … arising on
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or before September 3, 2013.” R8384; See iDrive Logistics LLC, 2018 UT App
40, ¶ 79; Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶67; Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶18.
C. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Kathy’s assertion that
Wende has not complied with the estate closing order.
Kathy’s brief raises various unsubstantiated arguments related to issues
that arose after the April 12, 2017 final order from which she appeals. For
example, it asserts that “deed distributions were incomplete, untimely and not
prepared according to the terms of the Settlement or the D.Court’s instructions.”
Br.Aplt. 17. It then asserts that there is a “pending order to show cause,”
apparently based on Kathy’s October 19, 2017 motion for order to show cause.
Br.Aplt. 18.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of these arguments because
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the issues and the record as it stood as of the
April 12, 2017 final order closing probate. A timely notice of appeal is required
to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. See Utah R. App. P. 4. “A notice of
appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an
order disposing of any [rule 60(b) motion] shall be treated as filed after entry of
the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective
to appeal only from the underlying judgment.” Id. R. 4(b)(2); accord Bowen v.
Hart, 2012 UT App 351, ¶ 3, 294 P.3d 573 (“To bring the disposition of the rule
59 motion within the scope of the appeal, a new or amended notice of appeal
must be filed after the entry of the order resolving the motion.”).
-37-

Accordingly, to the extent Kathy’s brief asserts arguments related to issues
that arose after the final order she appealed from, it should be stricken because
those arguments fall outside the scope of Kathy’s appeal and this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider them. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2).
V. KATHY’S VARIOUS OTHER CLAIMS LACK MERIT.
Kathy also argues that this Court should reverse its award of attorney fees
to YHG, Van Cott and Isaac Paxman and that liens held by Hi-Country and Isaac
Paxman against certain real properties awarded to entities owned by Kathy and
Judy should be released.17 Although Wende responds to these arguments in her
capacity as special administrator of the Estate, she does not represent any of the
parties whose interests would be impacted by these arguments. Her response is
therefore limited to the Estate’s position and to jurisdictional issues.
As an initial matter, Wende renews her argument that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over Kathy’s arguments related to YHG, Van Cott, Isaac Paxman, or
Hi-Country, because Kathy did not join them as parties. See Davis v. Mercantile
Tr. Co., 152 U.S. 590, 593 (1894) (“[A]ll the parties to the record, who appear to
have any interest in the order or ruling challenged, must be given an opportunity

Kathy also appears to assert that the trial court should have awarded her “the
appraised value of Coins” to be applied to her priority I claim. Br.Aplt. 6.
However, Kathy has provided no record citation to show where this issue was
preserved, nor does she provide even a cursory analysis to show that it should
have been obvious to the trial court that she was entitled to the coins or any value
received therefrom. This Court should therefore reject any argument in that
regard. See, e.g., Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 67; Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; Hawkins,
2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47.
17
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to be heard on such appeal.”); In re Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1172
(Utah 1991) (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Services Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983))
(“[I]f appellant’s identity as a creditor was known or ‘reasonably ascertainable,’
then the Due Process Clause requires that appellant be given ‘notice by mail or
other means as certain to ensure actual notice’” for nonclaims statute to apply);
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987) (“Courts can generally make a
legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the
action.”); Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-403(2)(a) (“[N]otice … shall be given to every
interested person.” Given that creditors are entitled to notice at other stages of
the proceeding, requiring estate creditors to affirmatively intervene in the appeal
rather than placing the burden on the appellant to ensure that all interested
parties whose rights would be impacted by the appeal are joined does not
comport with due process.
A. YHG was not a party to the settlement; Wende was statutorily
entitle to her attorney fees.
Kathy asserts that YHG’s attorney fees are unreasonable, should be
subrogated to her own claim, and that Wende should be personally liable for
those fees because “[a]ll attorneys agreed to Settlement” and “the parties set up
this specific [priority 2] category for payment of all legal fees.” Br.Aplt. 31-34, 42.
She also argues that the fees were unreasonable and some were related to
representation of Wende personally. Id. Br.Aplt. 31-33. In addition to generally
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failing to cite any record evidence or authority to support this argument, Kathy’s
brief ignores the basis for the trial court’s award of fees to YHG from the Estate—
the fees were “reasonable and appropriate,” YHG was not a party to the
settlement and did not agree to subordinate fees, and attorney fees were a
priority expense of administration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805.
R8385-386. Additionally, YHG had reclassified $17,211.00 in fees that were not
payable from the Estate. Id. Thus, because she fails to cite any relevant evidence
or authority, let alone acknowledge the basis for the trial court’s ruling, Kathy
cannot meet her burden of persuasion on appeal. See iDrive Logistics LLC, 2018
UT App 40, ¶ 79 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of the district
court’s ruling, we reject the challenge.”); Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 141 (appellant has
“burden of directing [the Court’s] attention to specific facts in the record to
support her contention that the district court abused its discretion”).
In any event, Kathy has not shown an abuse of discretion, let alone plain
error because it is fundamental that “the ‘provisions of a contract’ would not
apply to a mere party to the litigation who is unmentioned in the contract.”
Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 766. “Most contracts
bind only those who bargain for them, and ‘the burden of proof for showing the
parties’ mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is on the party
claiming that there is a contract.’” Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d
40 (citing Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998) and
quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah
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1995)). Given that the settlement agreement references only the fees of Karen
Kreeck, Van Cott, and Isaac Paxman, Kathy cannot show that the trial court
plainly erred in ruling that YHG’s fees were not subject to the settlement.
Nor is Kathy’s assertion that Wende should be personally liable persuasive.
The Utah code provides that costs and expenses of administration are a priority
claim, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805. It further provides that a “personal
representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable compensation for their
services.” Id. § 75-3-718(1). Further, “[i]f any personal representative or person
nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in
good faith, whether successful or not, the personal representative is entitled to
receive from the estate all necessary expenses and disbursements, including
reasonable attorney fees incurred.”18 Id. § 75-3-719.
For the above Kathy’s argument that Wende should be personally liable for
YHG’s fees associated with the Estate or that those fees should be paid after hers
lack merit. Br.Aplt. 34.
B. Kathy’s arguments related to Van Cott, Paxman, and Hi-Country
Likewise Kathy fails to acknowledge the basis for the trial court’s awards of
fees of Paxman and Van Cott, or its ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to remove the

Kathy’s brief also fails to cite any record evidence in support of her allegation
that YHG’s representation presented a conflict of interest. Br.Aplt. 38. The
record does not support this accusation, particularly where Wende was not
reimbursed for YHG’s representation of her as an individual. R4595, 8386.
18

-41-

Hi Country and Paxman liens. See generally Br.Aplt. 29-35. She also fails to
identify where in the record she preserved her arguments in that regard. This
Court should therefore decline to consider those arguments. See, e.g., Roberts,
2015 UT 24, ¶ 18 (the Court may “disregard or strike briefs that do not comply
with rule 24’s substantive requirements”).
In any event, even if Kathy could show plain error, the remedy would not
be to pay Kathy’s priority one claim in full. It would be to remand to the trial
court to determine a fair redistribution of the funds pro-rata among Kathy,
Wende, and Roy. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902(2) (“Abatement within
each classification is in proportion to the amounts of property each of the
beneficiaries would have received if full distribution of the property had been
made in accordance with the terms of the will.”). As stated, Wende is the only
party to the settlement with a priority I claim who has received no payment, and
as stated she has not taken payment from the Estate for her time. As a result,
Kathy’s requested relief is not only not allowed under the law, it would be
manifestly unjust.
Finally, to the extent Kathy argues that the trial court should have removed
the Hi-Country and Isaac Paxman liens so that she could receive quiet title, her
brief ignores that the trial court specifically ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to do
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so.19 Br.Aplt. 27, 29-30. In addition, Kathy has no standing to challenge the
Paxman lien against the Cherokee Lane property because she has no legal interest
in that property. And, because Kathy’s entities, not Kathy individually, own the
Hi-Country lots, she is not a proper party to challenge the Hi-Country liens. See,
e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶50, 123 P.3d 416 (“To satisfy the ‘basic
requirements’ of the traditional standing test, ‘a party must allege that he or she
has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable to the
conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.’”)
(quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 735; Packer v.
National Service Indus., Inc., 909 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Utah App. 1996)
(codefendant in a multiparty litigation could not oppose a summary judgment
motion between other parties where no cross-claim had been brought).
Moreover, Kathy claimed actual ownership of the Hi-Country lots in at
least one creditor’s claim. R11752. And the settlement agreement specifically
stated there “is no warranty or obligation to deliver Hi-Country to Kathy free and
clear of all claims” and stated the “claims or encumbrances relating to HiCountry follow the property.” R14222. Thus, because Hi-Country did not appeal
the trial court’s ruling that the Estate was not liable to pay its judgment and
because Kathy agreed to be otherwise bound, she cannot show that the trial court
To the extent Kathy argues the settlement granted jurisdiction,
“‘acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court.’” First Nat'l Bank of Layton v. Palmer, 2018 UT 43, ¶ 6, 427 P.3d 1169
(quoting A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991)).
19
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plainly erred. Likewise, because Judy did not appeal, Kathy cannot show the trial
court plainly erred in declining to remove the lien Judy agreed to from the
Cherokee Lane property.
VI. This Court should award Wende her attorney fees and
costs on appeal.
A. Wende is entitled to attorney fees because Kathy’s brief is
frivolous and for delay.
This Court should award Wende her attorney fees under Rules 24(i) or
33(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court may “strike or disregard a
brief that contains burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters,
and the court may assess an appropriate sanction including attorney fees for the
violation.” Utah R. App. P. 24(i). As stated, Kathy’s brief is riddled with false and
scandalous matters, fails to even acknowledge the trial court’s rulings, let alone
explain how they were an abuse of discretion, and includes so few record citations
and so minimal legal analysis that that her brief “expect[s] that opposing counsel
or the court will do” her work for her. See A.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 16. This Court
should therefore strike her brief and award Wende her costs and fees incurred on
behalf of the Estate in defending against it. See supra Point I.
In addition, on a finding that a brief is frivolous or for delay, this Court
must award the prevailing party “just damages,” i.e. single or double costs and/or
attorney fees. A frivolous brief is “not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law.” Utah R. App. P. 33(b). An appeal filed for delay “is one interposed for any
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improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper.” Id.
Although Rule 33(b) sanctions are reserved for “egregious cases,” it is
available in cases that are “obviously without any merit and has been taken with
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of
the judgment.” See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) (Rule 33
sanctions appropriate where plaintiff’s repeated civil actions against defendant
forced her to pay substantial costs and fees); Harris v. Harris, 2002 UT App
401U (Rule 33 sanctions appropriate where “Husband has obfuscated and
mischaracterized the issues in an attempt to mislead this court and provide
legitimacy to his appeal.”); see also Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 54, 416
P.3d 487 (nonfrivolous appeal “brought with the intention of hindering or
delaying restoration of the property” at issue violated Rule 33).
As stated above, Kathy’s brief is peppered with false and scandalous
allegations against Wende, includes irrelevant material, and includes so little
analysis that it is a challenge to respond to. She has not made even a cursory
showing that her arguments are “grounded in fact, … warranted by existing law,
or … based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.”
See Utah R. App. P. 33(b). She has “obfuscated and mischaracterized the issues
in an attempt to mislead this court and provide legitimacy to [her] appeal.” See
Harris, 2002 UT App 401U.
-45-

For example, Kathy’s brief asserts that Wende breached her duty by taking
out a loan to pay the State Street property taxes, when the trial court specifically
found no breach, Br.Aplt. 40; R10818-23. Kathy’s argument also ignores that the
Estate simply had no liquid funds, that the Court ordered the loan, and that
Wende had negotiated with the original lender. R10824-826. Likewise, Kathy’s
arguments entirely ignore the trial court’s ruling that her allegations were either
released by the settlement or lacking in credibility. R8384-385. Nor does she
acknowledge that the trial court declined to revisit that ruling because the “long,
repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated attacks, repeated attacks on the special
administrator.... just haven't stood up to the analysis of the facts.” R17525.
Finally, this appeal is the culmination of eight years’ of persistent
venomous attacks against Wende as special administrator that has resulted in
over $440,000 in legal fees. See, e.g., R418, R5285, R5464, R8140-142. Kathy’s
assertions related to other Hi-Country litigation, see Br.Aplt. 29, 36, and her
various baseless allegations against Wende related to the court’s order, see
Br.Aplt. 17-18, 23, suggest that rather than seeking legitimate legal recourse,
Kathy is improperly using this Court either to revisit rulings of other courts, or as
an expensive means to delay the estate distribution and further harass Wende
while other matters are decided. Such an “improper purpose” has caused
“needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.” See Utah R. App. P. 33(b);
Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 54.
-46-

As a result, Kathy should be ordered to pay Wende her attorney fees and
double costs incurred in defending this appeal on behalf of the Estate.
B. Wende is entitled to her attorney fees under the probate code.
Alternatively, Wende is entitled to her attorney fees by statute as special
administrator. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (“If any personal representative or
person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the personal representative is
entitled to receive from the estate all necessary expenses and disbursements,
including reasonable attorney fees incurred.”). “This court has interpreted
attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a
statute initially authorizes them.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319
(Utah 1998). Additionally, “when a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, ‘the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal.’” Id. (quoting Utah Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197
(Utah App. 1991)).
Here, the trial court awarded Wende her statutory attorney fees incurred
fulfilling her role as special administrator from the Estate. R8391. She is also
entitled to her attorney fees on appeal, and a remand to determine an equitable
distribution of fees.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wende, through counsel, respectfully asks the
Court to affirm the trial court’s order closing the estate. She also requests an
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award of her attorney fees and double her costs on appeal. Wende does not
believe that oral argument would assist the Court in deciding this case.

Respectfully submitted on February 11, 2019.
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Counsel for Appellee
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